VOlUME 05 ISSUE 05 May 2026
Dr Angela Mucece Kithinji
Faculty of Business and Management Sciences, University of Nairobi, Kenya
DOI : https://doi.org/10.58806/ijsshmr.2026.v5i5n25Google Scholar Download Pdf
ABSTRACT
Early civilization is a principle of many countries since everything tends to have a history of where everything began. The human race is associated with early civilization because the early man who was described as the homosapiens who later evolved to monkeys and to the now human race that is able to reason, strategize and control the activities of the Universe. Country languages are used to communicate and countries tends to have their internal languages such as tribal languages and inter-tribal languages differentiated by different dialects and different tones (Herber, 1989; Eriksen, 2022). Cross country languages are languages that are used to communicate between countries and global languages and are languages that are accepted globally which are majorly English and French. The objective of the study was to evaluate the relationship between early civilization, country languages and conflict resolution in Africa. An E-Questionnaire was administered to respondents from different countries which were then summarized and descriptive statistics and inferential statistics were estimated and interpreted and summarized in tables. Regression analysis was used to establish the relationships between the study aspects. The sub-objectives of the study were; to determine the effect of early civilization on conflict resolution in Africa, to establish the influence of country languages on conflict resolution in Africa, to establish the impact of early civilization on country languages in Africa and to finally establish the effect of early civilization, country languages and conflict resolution in Africa. Early civilization was measured using history; country languages was measured using dialect, tone, vernacular and English; while conflict resolution was measured using arbitration, court of law and out of court settlement. The study findings were that there is indeed early civilization in Africa as Africans have come along way historically even in terms of coulor and dress code. Many languages are used in different countries in Africa some of which are intra-country, others are inter-country, some are tribal languages, others are inter-tribal languages, yet others are intra-tribal languages. Countries such as Guinea Busau stated that they even have inter-family and intra-family languages. Globally accepted languages that Africans communicate with globally where found to be majorly English and French. Regression results revealed that early civilization significantly impacts on conflict resolution in Africa, early civilization influences country languages in Africa, country languages affects conflict resolution in Africa and collectively early civilization and country languages influences conflict resolution in Africa. The study findings are that there are countries with history and historical injustices associated with conflicts such as inter-tribal conflicts and even inter-country conflicts and experts in conflict resolution need to be engaged to resolve conflicts when they occur. Languages are crucial in conflict resolution since communicating effectively when resolving conflicts is important. Policies on history and historical injustices, country languages and conflict resolution are important in having stable countries in Africa.
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Cite this Article:Kithinji, D. A. M. (2026). Early Civilization, Country Languages and Conflict Resolution in Africa. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE HUMANITY & MANAGEMENT RESEARCHS, 5(5), 1138-1154. https://doi.org/10.58806/ijsshmr.2026.v5i5n25